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This study aims to examine the effect of tax expenses, foreign ownership on transfer 
pricing decisions. This study employs quantitative methods. This study's data type is 
secondary data from the financial statements of manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2017 to 2019. Data were obtained from the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange's official website at http: //www.idx.co.id. Sampling was conducted by 
purposive sampling technique with a final sample of 30 observations. Hypothesis testing is 
done by multiple regression analysis with panel data. This study concludes that tax expenses 
and intangible assets are positively associated with transfer pricing decisions, while foreign 
ownership is not associated with transfer pricing decisions. This study indicates that 
Indonesia's Tax Authority needs to exercise tighter supervision on MNCs with intangible 
assets. 
 
Keywords: Taxes, Transfer Pricing, Intangible Assets, Foreign Ownership 
 
Introduction 
Globalization, economic development, and business competition in an increasingly 
fast world have influenced business schemes and business actors. The development of the 
business world has encouraged the growth of national companies into multinational 
companies. Multinational companies operate across national borders and have unique 
relationships, either because of equity participation, management control, or technology, in the 
form of subsidiaries, branch companies, agents, etc., to maximize profit after tax (Suandy, 
2016). There have been various international transactions between members (divisions) of this 
affiliated multinational company, for example, the sale of goods or services. This transaction is 
the leading cause of transfer pricing practices. Transfer pricing is a pricing policy used in 
transactions between companies with related parties (Barker et al., 2017). For multinational 
companies, transfer pricing is necessary to ensure that transactions with their foreign-affiliated 
companies are carried out efficiently and track their divisions' performance (Rugman & Eden, 
2017). Transfer pricing becomes a problem for the government if the MNC deliberately adjusts 
related parties' prices for tax advantage purposes. According to Rugman and Eden (2017), the 
transfer pricing dispute between MNC and the government arises from a fundamental 
difference between business and government entities' roles. The MNE is responsible for 
efficient operation management while the government has the authority to collect taxes. Taxes 
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significantly impact a company's net income and cash flow through their influence on foreign 
investment decisions, financial structure, capital cost determination, etc. However, transfer 
pricing is also widely misused for corporate tax avoidance (Handayani & Widyanti, 2017). 
MNC takes advantage of existing tax regulatory loopholes to minimize taxes. Transfer pricing 
in goods or services sales transactions is carried out by reducing the selling price between 
companies in one group and transferring the profits earned to companies domiciled in 
countries that apply low tax rates (Cahyadi & Noviari, 2018). This condition can enhance the 
tax authorities' problems to maximize revenue from the tax sector, which is the state budget 
source. The Directorate General of Taxes as the Indonesian Tax Authority explained that digital 
progress and the impact of its disruption has had a direct effect on the transformation of the 
international taxation landscape and indirectly through the globalization variable 
(https://ekonomi.bisnis.com). Digitalization accelerates the globalization process, thereby 
increasing the volume and size of transactions across jurisdictions. It is estimated that around 
60-70% of the jurisdictional transactions are transactions conducted by multinational 
companies (www.taxjustice.net). The global challenge faced by almost all tax authorities 
related to this development is the impact of transfer pricing practices, one of which is tax 
disputes. In a report covering 89 jurisdictions, 2018 Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) 
Statistics, the OECD noted that the number of transfer pricing disputes increased by 20%.  
 
Transfer pricing is a significant issue in international taxation. Likewise, an 
understanding of transfer pricing is becoming increasingly urgent, and the development of 
global business patterns and transactions between multinational companies has increased 
drastically and is much more complicated. The case of tax avoidance through transfer pricing 
schemes has always been in the global spotlight, and tax disputes resulting from transfer 
pricing transactions are also growing. The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia 
noted that around 2000 companies owned by foreigners did not pay their taxes for ten years, 
so that the state suffered Rp. 500 trillion in losses (Kusumawati, 2016). Besides, the 
unavailability of standard regulations causes transfer pricing checks to be often won by 
taxpayers in tax courts so that multinational companies are increasingly motivated to carry out 
transfer pricing (Julaikah, 2014 in Refgia, 2017). In resolving a transfer pricing case, the tax 
authorities must first detect a special relationship to a transaction, then analyze and prove any 
irregularities in the selling or buying price between the affiliated parties. Based on the 
Regulation of the Director-General of Taxes Number PER-32/PJ/2011, the fair price in transfer 
pricing is the price or profit that occurs in a transaction made between parties who have no 
special relationship in comparable conditions or a price that is determined as a price comply 
with the fairness and arm's length principle. This principle is based on the norm that the price 
of a transaction made by unrelated parties is determined by market forces so that the 
transaction reflects a fair market price. In transfer pricing, the arm's length principle is used as 
a guideline for determining a multinational company's transfer price. The Indonesia Ministry 
of Finance issued a new regulation as an alternative to the resolution of transfer pricing 
disputes through the Minister of Finance Decree Number 22/PMK.03/2020 dated 18 March 2020 
concerning Procedures for Implementing Advance Pricing Agreements. The previous decree 
was PMK Number 7/PMK.03/2015 dated January 12, 2015. This regulation is a form of the 
government's commitment to implementing the Action Plan 14 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project, implementing more effective provisions, and providing 
certainty. Previously, through Indonesia Ministry Finance, the government had also 
implemented PMK-213/PMK.03/2016, which stipulated that corporate taxpayers conducting 
transactions with affiliated parties had an obligation to submit a summary of transfer pricing 
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documentation (TP Doc). This regulation is also a form of implementation of the OECD 
recommendations in the BEPS Action Plan 13. The issuance of these regulations shows the 
government's seriousness in facing the transfer pricing scheme to prevent the loss of potential 
taxes that support 80% of total state revenue. There are many studies on transfer pricing, as in 
Arham et al. (2020). Previous studies have been conducted using tax expenses (Sulistyawati et 
al., 2020; Tiwa et al., 2017; Kiswanto and Purwaningsih, 2014; Nazihah et al., 2019; Fitri et al., 
2019; Refgia, 2017; Noviastika. et al., 2016; Indrasti, 2016; Saifudin and Putri, 2018; Jumaidi et 
al., 2017; Khotimah, 2018; Pratiwi, 2018; Halil et al., 2019; Herawaty and Anne, 2017; Jafri and 
Mustikasari, 2018; Rosa et al., 2017; Rachmat, 2019), Tunneling Incentive (Sulistyawati et al., 
2020; Nazihah et al., 2019; Susanti & Firmansyah, 2018; Refgia, 2017; Noviastika et al., 2016; 
Saifudin and Putri, 2018; Jumaidi et al., 2017; Khotimah, 2018; Pratiwi, 2018; Herawaty and 
Anne, 2017; Jafri and Mustikasari, 2018; Rosa et al., 2017), Bonus Mechanism (Sulistyawati et 
al., 2020; Nazihah et al. ., 2019; Fitri et al., 2019; Susanti & Firmansyah, 2018; Refgia, 2017; 
Indrasti, 2016; Saifudin and Putri, 2018; Herawaty and Anne, 2017; Rosa et al., 2017; Rachmat, 
2019), Ownership Foreign (Tiwa et al ., 2017; Kiswanto and Purwaningsih, 2014; Fitri et al., 
2019; Refgia, 2017; Indrasti, 2016; Halil et al., 2019), Company Size (Kiswanto and 
Purwaningsih, 2014; Waworuntu and Hadisaputra, 2016; Nazihah et al., 2019; Refgia, 2017; 
Khotimah, 2018; Halil et al., 2019), Profitability (Waworuntu and Hadisaputra, 2016; Jumaidi 
et al., 2017; Halil et al., 2019), Leverage (Waworuntu and Hadisaputra, 2016; Indrasti, 2016; 
Pratiwi, 2018; Rosa et al., 2017; Firmansyah and Yunidar, 2020), Multinationality (Waworuntu 
and Hadisaputra, 2016; Dinca and Fitriana, 2019), Intangible Assets (Waworuntu and 
Hadisaputra, 2016; Dinca and Fitriana, 2019; Jafri and Mustikasari, 2018; Firmansyah and 
Yunidar, 2020), Good Corporate Governance (Noviastika et al., 2016; Jumaidi et al., 2017; Halil 
et al., 2019; Sari, 2020; Dinca dan Fitriana, 2019; Herawaty dan Anne, 2017; Rosa et al., 2017). 
 
This study examines the effect of taxes, foreign ownership, and intangible assets on 
transfer pricing decisions. According to research conducted by Sulistyawati et al. (2020), taxes 
have a significant positive effect on the transfer pricing decisions of companies. It is also in line 
with the results of Rachmat's (2019) research that the practice of transfer pricing is believed to 
reduce the potential for tax revenue of a country. Taxes are considered an expense that can 
reduce company profits so that management carries out tax planning and even tax avoidance. 
Companies carry out transfer pricing from a tax perspective to minimize the tax expenses by 
manipulating or restructuring transfer prices between companies with a special relationship 
through corporate tax planning (Tiwa et al., 2017). This price engineering is carried out by 
reducing the selling price between companies in one group and transferring the profits earned 
to companies domiciled in countries that apply low tax rates. Another reason is that 
multinational companies shift their income to countries with lower tax rates in which their 
affiliated companies operate. In general, transfers between affiliated companies in 
multinational companies result in lower tax expenses (Sulistyawati et al., 2020). However, Rosa 
et al. (2017) found that taxes have no positive effect on transfer pricing. The inconsistency of 
the previous test results resulted in an investigation of the tax expenses on transfer pricing 
decisions requiring further investigation. 
 
Furthermore, there are several forms of ownership in the ownership structure, foreign 
ownership. Foreign ownership arises because of foreign investment, which according to 
Indonesian Act Number 25 of 2007 article 1 paragraph (6) concerning Investment is defined as 
an investment activity to conduct business in the Republic of Indonesia, which is carried out 
by foreign investors using foreign capital, Wholly or jointly with domestic investors. Transfer 
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pricing is a transaction carried out by a company with foreign parties, so foreign shareholders 
who control the company influence its decision to carry out transfer pricing (Tiwa et al., 2017). 
A controlling shareholder is an entity that owns shares of 20% or more directly or indirectly so 
that the entity is considered to have a significant influence in controlling the company (PSAK 
15, 2015). Research by Fitri et al. (2019) and Halil et al. (2019) concluded that foreign ownership 
positively affects the company's transfer pricing decision. The high level of foreign ownership 
will affect transfer pricing practices. A large number of foreign shareholdings can put 
shareholders in a strong position to control the company, including implementing transfer 
pricing policies. 
 
Meanwhile, Tiwa et al. (2017) found that foreign ownership does not affect its transfer 
pricing decisions. The percentage of foreign ownership in a company is not a benchmark in 
applying transfer pricing. Testing inconsistencies in previous studies results has resulted in re-
testing foreign ownership of transfer pricing decisions is necessary. Intangible assets are non-
monetary assets that can be identified without their physical form. These assets are held for use 
in producing or delivering goods or services, for lease to other parties, or administrative 
purposes. (PSAK 19, 2010). Company managers can utilize intangible assets as assets that are 
difficult to detect to fulfill their interests. The company can transfer intangible assets to its 
subsidiaries or affiliated companies. This condition will be easy to do in multinational 
companies. The ease with which multinational companies transfer intangible assets will 
increase company managers' motivation to transfer pricing, especially for companies with 
considerable intangible assets.  
 
Jafri and Mustikasari (2018) found that intangible assets do not affect transfer pricing 
behavior. The results of this study are in line with Ohnuma and Kato (2015). The number of 
intangible asset transactions does not reflect its management's opportunistic actions in transfer 
pricing behavior. The valuation of intangible assets is also not straightforward because 
determining the value under the same conditions must be done with a third or independent 
party. However, on average, transactions of intangible assets are carried out with one group or 
related parties. However, the results of Waworuntu and Hadisaputra's (2016) research 
regarding the determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness in Indonesia state that intangible 
assets have a negative effect on a company's transfer pricing decisions. Transfers from 
intangible assets pose a significant risk to transfer pricing aggressiveness because of the 
variability in interpreting the value of intangible assets and the difficulty in determining the 
intangible assets involved in the transaction. Another study conducted by Firmansyah and 
Yunidar (2020) resulted in different conclusions: that intangible asset transactions positively 
affect transfer pricing aggressiveness. This research states that the increase in a company's 
intangible asset transactions causes transfer pricing's aggressiveness to increase. These four 
studies produced mixed conclusions. The possibility that underlies this difference is the proxy 
for calculating the effect of intangible assets on transfer pricing. Therefore, the previous 
research results' inconsistency resulted in a re-examination of intangible assets against the 
transfer pricing decision needed to be done. 
 
This study's control variables are company size (Herawaty and Anne, 2017; 
Firmansyah and Yunidar, 2020) and leverage (Aryotama and Firmansyah, 2019; Dewi and 
Noviari, 2017). The company's size is used by considering companies with more prominent 
affiliations have a more incredible opportunity in tax planning through transfer pricing. 
Leverage is used as a control variable because company debt is closely related to its interest 
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expense. The high-interest expense can reduce the profit earned by the company. Companies 
with a high level of debt utilization will prioritize their focus on debt repayments, which impact 
corporate decision-making decisions, including transfer pricing. This study uses financial 
statement data from manufacturing companies included in the category of multinational 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2017-2019 period because transfer 
pricing is usually only carried out by multinational companies. When viewed from its 
characteristics, multinational companies tend to choose certain business activities that are 
footloose industry (industries that are not bound by location), generally owned by 
manufacturing companies, so that many manufacturing companies in Indonesia are 
multinational companies. 
 
Literature Review  
Positive Accounting Theory 
This theory explains the factors that influence management in choosing optimal 
accounting procedures and have unique reasons. According to Kusuma and Wijaya (2017), 
accounting procedures are used by companies that are not the same as one another, and 
companies are given the freedom to choose alternative procedures that can be done to minimize 
costs and maximize the value of company contracts so that they are related to the company's 
transfer pricing practices. Transfer pricing is carried out to minimize company costs in the form 
of paid taxes. Scott (2015) stated that accounting theory is positively related to company 
managers' prediction of accounting policy decisions and how managers respond to the latest 
accounting standards. Positive accounting theory assumes that managers have rational traits 
such as investors, and managers will choose accounting policies that provide benefits for 
themselves. Management can choose various motivations in order to get benefits. Positive 
accounting theory provides three hypotheses of management motives in increasing company 
profits from opportunistic actions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Three hypotheses describe 
this opportunistic behavior according to Watts and Zimmerman (1986). First, the bonus plan 
hypothesis. Managers will be motivated by the bonus policy that the company owner will 
implement. If the owner determines the bonus calculated based on profit, the manager can be 
motivated to do better, but it is also possible that the manager will commit managerial fraud. 
 
Managers will tend to report the highest possible profit by using accounting policies 
that maximize profit. Second, the debt covenant hypothesis deals with the conditions that the 
company must meet in the debt agreement. This hypothesis states that the closer a company is 
to violating debt agreements, the more likely it is that company managers will choose 
accounting procedures that can shift future earnings to the present period. It is a game of profit 
so that the lending party does not get information on the company's real condition because the 
provision of debt generally depends on the ratios in the financial statements, which are affected 
by profit. Third, the political cost hypothesis states that large companies with high-profit levels 
are often the object of implementing government regulations and policies, such as imposing 
high-income taxes. It causes managers to choose accounting policies that shift current earnings 
to future periods to reduce political costs, reducing corporate profits by reducing taxable 
income. Based on the three hypotheses, the bonus plan hypothesis can influence transfer 
pricing decisions. According to this hypothesis, the manager's motive is that managers tend to 
increase company profits if the bonus is calculated based on the amount of profit earned. It can 
lead to fraud, one of which is by minimizing the tax expenses using transfer pricing practices 
to increase company profits. Besides, The Political Cost Hypothesis also greatly influences 
transfer pricing decisions. Political costs in the form of taxes imposed by the government are 
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determined based on its profits. This condition encourages managers to manage profit in a 
certain amount so that the tax imposed is not too high, which can be done by avoiding taxes 
through transfer pricing practices. Management of company profits by using transfer pricing 
in sales transactions of goods or services is carried out by reducing the selling price between 
companies in one group and transferring profits to companies domiciled in countries that 
apply low tax rates (Cahyadi & Noviari, 2018).  
 
Hypothesis Development  
Based on positive accounting theory, a political cost hypothesis states that the more 
significant its political costs, the greater the tendency for companies to use accounting methods 
to reduce their profits. Companies intend to reduce the government's attention regarding the 
imposition of high taxes as a factor that increases political costs. This reason could be a possible 
relationship between taxes and transfer pricing. High tax payments make companies avoid 
taxes. One of the tax avoidance practices for multinational companies is transfer pricing. In 
transfer pricing activities, multinational companies with several branches in various countries 
tend to shift their tax obligations from countries with high tax rates to countries that apply low 
tax rates (Refgia, 2017). The higher the country's tax rate, the more likely the company will 
carry out transfer pricing. The results of Sulistyawati et al. (2020) state that taxes have a 
significant positive effect on companies' transfer pricing decisions. It is also in line with the 
results of research by Indrasti (2016), Noviastika et al. (2016), Tiwa et al. (2017), Jafri and 
Mustikasari (2018), Khotimah (2019), and Nazihah et al. (2019). The company's motive is to 
maximize profit, one of the ways is by minimizing expenses. In general, companies identify tax 
payments as an expense to use transfer pricing practices to minimize the tax expenses. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis in this study is as follows:  
H1: Tax expenses are positively associated with transfer pricing decisions. 
 
Foreign ownership is the ownership of shares owned by foreign individuals or 
institutions. Asian companies, especially in Indonesia, use a concentrated ownership structure. 
Concentrated ownership structures tend to create conflicts of interest between controlling 
shareholders and management and non-controlling shareholders (Refgia, 2017). When the 
share ownership owned by the foreign controlling shareholder is greater, the foreign 
controlling shareholder has a more significant influence in determining various decisions in 
the company, including pricing policies and the number of transfer pricing transactions (Tiwa 
et al., 2017). The foreign controlling shareholder sells the company's products he controls to his 
private company at below-market prices. Foreign controlling shareholders do this to gain 
personal gain and disadvantage non-controlling shareholders (Atmaja, 2011). Research 
conducted by Indrastri (2016), Refgia (2017), Fitri et al. (2019), and Halil et al. (2019) stated that 
foreign ownership has a positive and significant effect on the company's transfer pricing 
decision. The high level of foreign ownership will affect transfer pricing practices. A large 
number of foreign shareholdings can put shareholders in a strong position to control the 
company, including implementing transfer pricing policies. Therefore, the second hypothesis 
in this study is as follows.  
H2: Foreign ownership has a positive effect on transfer pricing decisions. 
 
Based on positive accounting theory, a bonus plan hypothesis states that companies 
that use bonus planning will undoubtedly use an accounting method to increase their recorded 
profits for a given period. Due to the difficulty of measuring the value of intangible assets, the 
transfer value of intangible asset payments, for example, royalties, also becomes challenging to 
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measure at a fair price according to the arm's length principle. It will motivate managers to 
commit managerial fraud by playing with the size of the numbers in the financial statements, 
in this case, the transfer value of intangible assets so that they always get a bonus because it 
has increased the company's profitability. 
 
Multinational companies will strategically reallocate their intangible assets to business 
units located in countries with low tax rates, and one example is receiving royalty payments 
from affiliated companies located in countries with high tax rates (Dudar et al., 2015). The 
valuation of intangible assets is still subjective because there is no comparative data available 
to measure transfer value's suitability based on market value. 
 
Transfer of intangible assets poses a significant risk to the aggressiveness of transfer 
pricing due to differences in interpreting the valuation and the difficulty in determining the 
accuracy of the value of intangible asset transactions that occurs (Grubert, 2003). It is supported 
by previous research conducted by Firmansyah and Yunidar (2020), which results that 
intangible asset transactions positively affect transfer pricing aggressiveness. The increase in a 
company's intangible asset transactions causes transfer pricing's aggressiveness to increase. 
There is a possibility that there is a relationship between intangible assets and the company's 
consideration of transfer pricing. Therefore, the third hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
H3: Intangible assets have a positive effect on transfer pricing. 
 
Methodology  
This research employs quantitative methods. The type of data processed in this study 
is secondary data. The data used is in the form of financial statements of manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2017 to 2019. Data were obtained 
from the official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange at the address http://www.idx.co.id. 
Besides, this study is a research that uses panel data (pooled data). Sampling was conducted 
by purposive sampling technique, namely with the following criteria: 
 
Table 1 Research Sample 
Criteria Amount  
All manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in June 
2020 
187 
Manufacturing companies registered after January 1, 2017 -30 
Manufacturing companies that have consecutive incomplete Financial 
Statements for 2017 s.d. 2019 
-19 
Manufacturing companies that do not report intangible assets in the Statement 
of Financial Position 
-90 
Manufacturing companies that do not report consecutive net income in 2017 
s.d. 2019 
-15 
Manufacturing companies not owned by foreign parties ≥20% -21 
Manufacturing companies that do not disclose receivables from related parties -2 
The amount of company data used in the study 10 
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The dependent variable used in this study is the transfer pricing decision. Transfer 
pricing decisions are measured by comparing receivables from related parties with the 
company's total receivables (Kusuma and Wijaya, 2017). The choice of the dependent variable 
proxy refers to previous research by Khotimah (2018).  
 
Transfer Pricing =  




The independent variables consist of taxes, foreign ownership, and intangible assets. 
This study uses the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) as a tax proxy, referring to Sulistyawati et al. 
(2020), Tiwa et al. (2017), Waworuntu, and Hadisaputra (2016).  
 
ETR =  




Where ETR = Effective tax rate  
 
Foreign ownership proxy is measured following the proportion of ordinary shares held 
by foreigners, as Tiwa et al. (2017), Fitri et al. (2019), and Refgia (2017):  
 
𝐹oreign ownership =  
Total foreign ownership 
Total shares outstanding 
 
 
Intangible Assets proxy follows Firmansyah and Yunidar (2020) as follows:  





Besides, this study uses control variables consisting of firm size and leverage. The 
company's size is used by considering companies with more prominent affiliations have a more 
incredible opportunity in tax planning through transfer pricing. In this study, company size is 
measured by the logarithm of total assets, which refers to Waworuntu and Hadisaputra (2016), 
Nazihah et al. (2019), Aryotama and Firmansyah (2019), and Firmansyah and Yunidar (2020). 
 
Size = logarithm Total Assets 
 
Leverage shows how much debt is used to finance the company (Waworuntu and 
Hadisaputra, 2016). The choice of leverage as a control variable refers to Pratiwi (2018), 







Hypothesis testing is conducted using multiple regression with panel data.  
The research model is as follows:  
𝑇𝑃 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖 𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  ɛ𝑖𝑡  
 
Where:  
TP Transfer Pricing Decisions  
ETRit: Company tax I year t  
FOROWNit: Foreign ownership of company I year t  
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INTANit: Intangible Assets company I year t  
SIZEit: Company size I year t  
LEVit: Leverage company I year t  
ɛit: Error. 
 
Results and Discussions 
In summary, the descriptive analysis of the variables used in this study is presented in the 
following table.  
Tabel 2 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 TP ETR INTANG FOROWN LEV SIZE 
 Mean  0.1769  0.2562  0.0180  0.5536  0.3900  13.1097 
 Median  0.0715  0.2602  0.0122  0.5100  0.3963  12.9735 
 Max  0.9631  0.3821  0.0668  0.9246  0.7442  14.5465 
 Min.  0.0014  0.0042  0.0037  0.2078  0.1492  12.2151 
 Std. Dev. 0.2494  0.0701  0.0176  0.2102  0.1644  0.71393 
Source: Processed 
 
Furthermore, the multiple regression test for panel data model selection is to use the 
common effect model. The test results are as follows:  
Table 2 Summary of Hypothesis Test 
Variable Coeff. t-Stat. Prob.  
C 2.3940 6.3166 0.000 *** 
ETR -0.4753 -2.3190 0.014 ** 
INTANGASSET 4.4914 4.3789 0.000 *** 
KEPASING -0.5493 -7.4213 0.000 *** 
LEV 0.1816 1.7178 0.049 ** 
SIZE -0.1500 -5.3220 0.000 *** 
R2 0.7555    
Adj. R2 0.7045    
F-stat. 14.833    
Prob(F-stat.) 0.0000    
Source: Processed 
 
The association between tax expenses and transfer pricing  
This study indicates that the tax expenses are negatively associated with transfer 
pricing decisions. The result of this study is in line with Khotimah (2018). The result indicates 
that the more tax expenses, the more cautious companies make transfer pricing decisions and 
tend to reduce the company's transfer pricing decisions. Besides, the supervision of tax officers 
on companies with high tax expenses will be tighter. When associated with positive accounting 
theory, this study's result confirms the political cost hypothesis. The hypothesis states that large 
companies with high-profit levels are widely used to implement government regulations and 
policies, such as high-income taxes. A high-profit rate will lead to a high tax expense as well. 
Thus the higher the profit, the higher the tax expenses, the greater the government's 
supervision of the company. 
 
On the other hand, it is not certain that companies with lower tax expenses will not 
carry out transfer pricing activities. Based on the political cost hypothesis, it can be assumed 
that companies that have lower profits will be less likely to be the object of government policy 
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implementation so that they have less supervision. The Indonesia Minister of Finance Decree 
Number 213/PMK.03/2016 regulates the criteria for Taxpayers obliged to organize and keep 
Transfer Pricing Documents. In article 2 paragraph (2c), it is stated that Taxpayers conducting 
affiliated transactions with Affiliated Parties who are in a country or jurisdiction with an 
income tax rate lower than the income tax rate as referred to in Article 17 of Indonesia Act 
Number 7 of 1983 concerning Income Tax as amended several times, most recently by 
Indonesia Act Number 36 of 2008 concerning the Fourth Amendment of Act Number 7 of 1983 
concerning Income Tax, it is obligatory to organize and keep Transfer Pricing Documents in 
the form of master documents and local documents. In this study, companies that are the object 
of research are multinational companies. After making observations, all sample companies are 
affiliated with a country with an income tax rate lower than Indonesia's income tax rate. One 
of the affiliated countries in this study sample is Singapore, which has a corporate income tax 
rate of 17%. Thus, all samples in this study have an obligation to keep the government's transfer 
pricing documents required. This document helps the Indonesia Tax Authority carry out 
compliance monitoring, inspection, preliminary evidence checking, or taxpayer investigations. 
The company's transfer pricing activities can be monitored in this document. The obligation to 
keep this document can also be suspected as a management consideration to make transfer 
pricing decisions more careful.  
 
The association between foreign Ownership and Transfer Pricing Decisions. 
This study states that foreign ownership is not associated with transfer pricing 
decisions. The result of this study is in line with the research of Tiwa et al. (2017). The 
percentage of foreign ownership in a company is not a benchmark in applying transfer pricing. 
The desire to control foreign shareholders to improve personal welfare is irrelevant because 
the sample companies' foreign ownership is not blood relatives. Expropriation is not easy to do 
because managerial decision-making requires approval from the board of directors. Large 
foreign ownership in a multinational company also does not necessarily mean that foreign 
shareholders are in a strong position to control the company, including applying transfer 
pricing policies. The existence of other non-foreign controlling shareholders may influence 
transfer pricing decisions.  
 
If associated with the bonus plan hypothesis, management can also take a role in 
transfer pricing decisions. Management who is directly involved in carrying out accounting 
recording activities and company operations will influence transfer pricing. Management will 
be given incentives or bonuses if, in an accounting period, company profits show good results. 
Moreover, transfer pricing can be done by manipulating transfer prices between entities in the 
accounting records so that if the board approves the transfer pricing of directors, transfer 
pricing can be implemented. Foreign ownership also does not affect transfer pricing decisions 
because it is suspected that foreign shareholders already understand international taxation and 
its consequences. Transfer pricing is one of the BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) schemes 
so that the OECD, together with the G20, formulate an action plan and take concrete steps to 
overcome the problem of state losses caused by the BEPS. Minister of Finance Regulation 
number PMK-213/PMK.03/2016, compared to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, is also in-
line (parallel). Thus, it is suspected that foreign shareholders do not want to take high risks in 
implementing the transfer pricing policy. If the company fails to meet the standards and is 
monitored by the tax authorities, the company will incur higher costs in terms of additional 
taxes, interest, and fines imposed by the tax authorities, affecting its reputation. This condition 
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is also in line with The Political Cost Hypothesis, which states that companies tend to reduce 
the spotlight or excessive government supervision to reduce political costs.  
 
The association between Intangible Assets and Transfer Pricing 
The result of this study indicates that intangible assets are positively associated with 
transfer pricing decisions. The result of this study is in line with Firmansyah and Yunidar 
(2020). An increase in the company's intangible assets can lead to increased transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. Some cases regarding transfer pricing with intangible assets can involve 
trademarks, service marks, or intellectual property. The parent company registers intangible 
assets that are created to transfer prices to a subsidiary in a country at a low tax rate. Intangible 
assets are one of the problematic assets to detect by tax officials so that company managers can 
use them to fulfill their interests by transferring to have a strong relationship with the company 
with a lower tax rate. This condition will be easy to do in multinational companies that are the 
sample of this study, where multinational companies have strong relationships with overseas 
companies that company shareholders own. The ease with which multinational companies can 
transfer intangible assets will increase company managers' motivation to transfer pricing 
actions. This result is also in line with the bonus plan hypothesis, which states that management 
will use an accounting method to increase the recorded profit because it has a bonus policy. 
With the difficulty of measuring intangible assets' value, the transfer value of intangible assets 
payments such as royalties is also challenging to measure at a fair price according to the arm's 
length principle. Besides, Firmansyah and Yunidar (2020) stated that identifying intangible 
assets is also tricky because not all intangible assets are protected by law registered and 
recorded in books. In the context of transfer pricing, each party must receive reasonable 
compensation for their contributions. It will motivate employees to carry out transfer pricing 
because company profitability can be achieved. One way is to arrange the figures in the 
financial statements in such a way, for example, by allocating intangible assets to low-tax 
countries using the transfer pricing mechanism.  
 
The regulation regarding transfer pricing in Indonesia, namely PMK-
213/PMK.03/2016, although it is parallel to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, there are still 
weaknesses in its implementation. Even though taxpayers have filled in the Special Attachment 
to the Special Relationship Transaction Statement on the annual notification letter, many 
taxpayers do not understand or pretend not to understand transfer pricing (Putri, 2018). 
Besides, Putri (2018) stated that the Directorate General of Taxes has not optimally monitor 
fraud committed on transfer pricing transactions because it does not have the necessary buying 
and selling data. Of course, it also motivates management to be more aggressive in carrying 
out transfer pricing, especially for intangible asset transactions whose measurements are 
subjective and therefore difficult for tax authorities to measure. 
 
Conclusions 
With the increasing tax expenses imposed, the more cautious companies make transfer 
pricing decisions and reduce their transfer pricing decisions. The government has issued a new 
regulation requiring companies to keep documents or information related to transfer pricing. 
On the other hand, companies with lower tax expenses cannot be ascertained not to carry out 
transfer pricing activities because it can be assumed that fewer companies will be the object of 
implementing government policies so that their supervision will be less. The percentage of 
foreign ownership in a company is not a benchmark in applying transfer pricing. The sample 
companies' foreign ownership is not in the form of blood relatives, so expropriation is not 
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straightforward. Besides, non-foreign shareholders and management can also influence 
transfer pricing decisions. An increase in the company's intangible assets can lead to increased 
transfer pricing aggressiveness. Intangible assets are challenging to detect and measure at a fair 
price by tax officials so that company managers can use them to fulfill their interests by 
transferring to have a strong relationship with the company with a lower tax rate. Companies 
that set bonus policies will motivate management to adjust the numbers in the financial 
statements to achieve company profitability by allocating intangible assets to low-tax countries 
using the transfer pricing mechanism. 
 
This study has limitations; the sample used is a multinational manufacturing company so that 
it cannot generalize the findings for all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This 
study only uses limited observations for three years, from 2017 to 2019. Future research expects 
to add variables that can influence transfer pricing decisions that have not been studied, such 
as profitability, good corporate governance, and earnings management. Future researchers are 
expected to expand the research sample for more accurate results. This study indicates that the 
Indonesia Tax Authority can improve taxation rules regarding intangible assets. Besides, The 
Authority can expand the compliance monitoring of Taxpayers conducting transfer pricing. 
Supervision of transfer pricing activities is carried out on companies with enormous tax 
expenses and taxpayers with lower tax expenses because lower tax expenses do not guarantee 
that companies do not carry out transfer pricing. 
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